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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
the contract. Subsection (3) provides for the application of Uniform
Commercial Code § 2-201 regardless of any agreement between the
parties. Section 2-201, in effect, requires a writing as to the quantity
of the goods when the price is 500 dollars or more. This provides
some measure of safety against oral evidence, if the contract as
modified would be within the Statute of Frauds. Lorensen, The
Uniform Commercial Code Sales Article Compared With West Vir-
ginia Law, 64W. VA. L. REV. 32, 58 (1961).
In the instant case, D could have effectively made use of the re-
quirement that the modification be in writing. In Massachusetts,
however, the Statute of Frauds is lost if it is not pleaded.
Section 2-209 (4) allows, by waiver, legal effect to be given
to the parties actual later conduct, regardless of a clause excluding
subsequent oral modification. UNIFoxur CoMMmCiAL CODE § 2-209,
comment 4.
Section 2-209 (5) provides that the waiver in subsection (4)
which affects an executory portion of the contract may be retracted
by "reasonable notification... unless the retraction would be unjust
in view of a material change of position in reliance on the waiver."
This section, as a unit, appears to protect those parties whose
transactions are governed by the Sales Article. The rejection of the
necessity for consideration coupled with the added requirements
of "good faith" and the Statute of Frauds, in certain cases, should
provide a safe, yet workable, solution. As a counseling point, HAwK-
LAND, SArs AN Buix SALEs 14 (1958), cautions the drafters of
contracts to exclude modifications except by a signed writing.
Thomas Edward McHugh
Trespass--Liability for Unintentional, Non-negligent Entry
P brought an action of trespass on the case under the old pro-
cedure against D, a Virginia corporation. The action arose out of
an accident between D's truck and an automobile. The driver of the
automobile negligently drove or skidded across the highway and
into D's truck. The truck cut to the right to avoid the automobile,
and, after impact, it traveled some 90 feet before striking and de-
molishing P's house. Trial court rendered a judgment for P, which
D appealed. Held, affirmed. Jury questions were presented as to
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negligence, if any, of the truck driver in traveling at an improper
speed, and whether such negligence, if any, contributed to the
damage of P's property. A verdict of the jury based upon sufficient
facts and supported by substantial evidence will not be disturbed.
Butler v. Smith's Transfer Corp., 128 S.E.2d 32 (W. Va. 1962).
This was an action of trespass on the case, and the judgment
was based upon the jury's finding that the defendant was negligent.
Would the defendant have been liable for damages resulting from
his trespass upon the land in the possession of the plaintiff if
there had been no basis for holding the defendant to be negligent?
The law pertaining to trespass upon land has been described as
both exceptionally simple and exceptionally rigorous. At common
law every unauthorized entry upon the soil of another was a tres-
pass. Probably the only defense was that the entry was from causes
beyond the trespasser's control. The strict and severe rules of the
action of trespass have survived to a considerable extent until the
present day. The most important rule to survive was that which
imposed liability for invasions of property which were neither in-
tended nor negligent. The defendant was not liable so long as he
had done no voluntary act. Thus if he was carried onto the plain-
tiff's land by others against his will, he was not liable for trespassing.
ThossEI, ToRTs § 13 (2d ed. 1955).
Trespass to land is said to be an intentional harm, and where
there is no intentional act, in the sense of an act voluntarily done,
there is no trespass. Kite v. Hamblen, 192 Tenn. App. 643, 241
S.W.2d 601 (1951) It is not necessary, however, that the trespasser
intend to commit a trespass or even that he know that his act will
constitute a trespass. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Bailey, 109 N.Y.S.2d
799 (Sup. Ct. 1952). When one voluntarily and deliberately does
an act upon his land which'resuilts in physical trespass upon lands in
other ownership, the liability is absolute. Ure v. United States, 93
F. Supp. 779 (D. Ore. 1950).
While a trespass often arises out of or is accomplished by an
act of negligence, liability for trespass may be wholly independent of
any act of negligence. Negligence is by no means a necessary ele-
ment in trespass. Corrington v. Kalicak, 319 S. W.2d 888 (Mo. App.
1959); Whitehead v. Zeiller, 265 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
The established rule in cases of trespass quare clausum fregit is
that the person causing the trespass is liable for resulting damage
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irrespective of negligence. Britton v. Harrison Coal Co.., 87 F.
Supp. 405 (S.D. W. Va. 1948).
The law on the subject of trespass to property is undergoing a
process of change. The most significant recent development is the
position taken by the Restatement of Torts which finds liability for
trespass only in the case of intentional intrusion, or negligence, or
some "extra-hazardous activity" on the part of the defendant.
Prosser, supra at § 13. The Restatement provides that an uninten-
tional and non-negligent entry on land of another, or causing a thing
or third person to enter the land, does not subject the actor to
liability, even though the entry causes harm to the possessor. RE-
STATEMENT, TORTS § 166 (1934).
Prosser believes this position will be adopted in time by the
courts and that strict liability will be confined to unusual and highly
dangerous enterprises such as blasting. Various courts have already
adopted the Restatement position. These courts hold that there
is no liability for a trespass unless it is intentional, the result of reck-
lessness or negligence, or the result of engaging in an extra-
hazardous activity. Gallin v. Poulou, 140 Cal. App. 2d 638, 295 P.2d
958 (1956). See also, Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Columbia
County, 3 Wis.2d 1, 87 N.W.2d 279 (1958); Edgarton v. Welch,
321 Mass. 603, 74 N.E.2d 674 (1947).
In a case somewhat similar to the principal one, the driver of a
loaded truck drove with brakes which he knew to be defective. The
brakes failed when he attempted to stop at an intersection, and, to
avoid a collision, he steered the truck off the road and into a building.
The case was based on both trespass and negligence, but it was held
that the driver was negligent as a matter of law. The court recog-
nized the modem trend of authority regarding trespass but left
open the subject of its application to a case of this character. Jewell
v. Dell, 284 S.W.2d 92 (Ky. 1955). One year later the same court
was called upon to decide another interesting case. A rock was
thrown from the wheels of a truck, striking and injuring the plaintiff.
There was no evidence of negligence by the driver. The court held
that an unintended entry does not constitute actionable trespass
and pointed out that an attempt to apply a strict rule of liability
based on trespass would lead to an incongruous result. To say that
the plaintiff could recover for her injuries if she was in her yard
but could not recover if she was one step outside of it is a patent
absurdity. The essential question is whether or not the defendant
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committed a culpable act, not the plaintiffs geographical location.
Randall v. Shelton, 293 S.W.2d 559 (Ky. 1956).
No West Virginia case has been found that would indicate that
this state has yet adopted the Restatement view of non-liability for
unintentional, non-negligent entries to land. It must be assumed,
then, that the strict rule of liability is still applicable in West Vir-
ginia. Under this view, even if the defendant in the principal case
was not negligent, he would be held strictly liable as a trespasser
on the plaintiff's property. His only defense would be that his
entry was involuntary-that he was carried onto plaintiffs property
against his will by the act of another person.
The adoption of the new West Virginia Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, abolishing the common-law forms of action and providing
for a "civil action", has no affect on the outcome of the principal
case. It is only matters of form which have been affected by these
provisions. The substantial distinctions and the principles of law
underlying the common-law forms of action remain, until modified
by statute. North River Ins. Co. v. Aetna Fin. Co., 186 Kan. 758,
352 P.2d 1060 (1960). To be entitled to recover the plaintiff need
only show that he is possessed of a right which has been violated
by the defendant, to the plaintiffs damage.
Thomas Richard Ralston
ABSTRACTS
Domestic Relations--Wife's Action For Loss of Consortium
P's husband was injured in an automobile accident. P brought
an action for loss of consortium against D on the theory that D
negligently caused the injury to P's husband. D's motion to dismiss
was sustained. Held, affirmed. A wife may not maintain an action
for loss of consortium of her husband caused by the negligence of the
defendant tort-feasor. Seagraves v. Legg, 127 S.E.2d 605 (W.Va.
1962).
Note is taken that this is a case of first impression in West
Virginia. A discussion of the division of authority on this issue
is found in 63 W. VA. L. REv. 186 (1961). The author of that com-
ment pointed out, as did the principal case, that the weight of
authority supports the view denying recovery to a wife under such
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